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INTRODUCTION
The creation of file sharing programs has led to an explosion in
the number of electronic music files transferred over the Internet.
These files, stored in the Moving Picture Experts Group Audio Layer 3
format (MP3), have become ubiquitous.
About half of the twelve to twenty-two year olds in the United
States with internet access have downloaded copyrighted music files.'
What once was tape-swapping practiced between friends is now an or-
ganized worldwide phenomenon. Each month, internet users ex-
change an estimated 400 million pirated music files.2 The recording
industry shipped 300 million fewer albums between 1999 and 2002
than it had in previous years. 3 The recording industry reports that
- B.S., University of Florida, 2002; candidate forJ.D., Cornell Law School, 2005; Note
Editor, Volume 90, Cornell Law Review. I would like to thank Christopher Clark, Aileen
Ocon, and Sean Thompson for investing countless hours editing this piece.
I See Steve Lohr, Fighting the Idea That All the Internet Is Free, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 9, 2003,
at Cl.
2 See id.
3 Id.
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shipments continue to decrease at a rate of about fifteen percent
annually.4
In response to these trends, Congress passed the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998.5 The DMCA not only estab-
lishes liability for individuals who illegally transfer copyrighted music,
but also establishes criteria by which to hold a company facilitating
these transfers liable. Through the DMCA, the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) sought to stop the electronic transfer
of copyrighted music between individuals.
At first, the RIAA attempted to shut down the individual services
that facilitated many of the file transfers. Although this strategy
worked initially,6 its ultimate effectiveness remains uncertain because
of a federal circuit split over whether the creators of modern file shar-
ing software are liable for its use in facilitating these transfers. 7 The
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to resolve the dispute.8 In
the meantime, the RIAA has implemented a new strategy by targeting
individual users involved in MP3 swapping. This tactic involves filing
mass lawsuits against users of file sharing programs such as Kazaa and
Morpheus. For instance, in a September of 2003 set of filings, the
RIAA sued 261 individuals allegedly involved in illegal file sharing,9
most of whom were college-age or younger.1 0
In addition to private enforcement, government agencies are also
involved in the process. For example, the FBI is working with the
RLAA to develop a warning seal similar to that seen on VHS tapes and
DVDs.1 In June of 2003, Congress proposed the Piracy Deterrence
and Education Act of 2003, an Act designed to increase the role of the
4 See Neil Strauss, Executives Can See Problems Beyond File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2003, at C1.
5 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1998)).
6 See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002) (af-
firming the district court's modified preliminary injunction and order "forcing Napster to
disable its file transfering service until certain conditions are met to achieve full compli-
ance with the modified preliminary injunction").
7 Compare Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding that defendants are not liable for contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004), with In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334
F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that Internet website operators can be held liable for
contributory and vicarious infringement), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
8 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
9 See Amy Harmon, 261 Lawsuits Filed on Music Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at
Al.
10 See id.
I I See Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2003: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 22 (2003)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement ofJana D. Monroe, Assistant Dir., Cyber Div., FBI), availa-
ble at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/monroe071703.htm.
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government in the enforcement process.'2 Under this Act, the FBI
would be responsible for detecting and notifying individuals allegedly
participating in the transfer of copyrighted materials over the In-
ternet. 3 In addition, the FBI would be responsible for "facilitat[ing]
the sharing among law enforcement agencies, Internet service provid-
ers, and copyright owners of information" relating to such behavior. 14
Unfortunately, this proposed legislation is not the correct solution to
the problem because it does not use government resources efficiently
and it threatens individual electronic privacy.
Part I of this Note outlines the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
the statutory authority that permits the prosecution of illegal file shar-
ing, and several criticisms of the Act. Part II discusses private at-
tempts, such as those by the RIAA, to enforce these regulations. Part
III analyzes and critiques the recent trend of increased government
involvement in this process, such as the proposed Piracy Deterrence
and Education Act of 2003. Finally, Part IV argues that Congress's
proposed legislation is flawed and should not be enacted. Given the
adequate remedies available through private enforcement, these mea-
sures are unnecessary, waste limited government resources, and raise
privacy concerns.
I
THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
A. The History of File Sharing and the DMCA
The Internet was once an unregulated, "Wild West"' 5 electronic
community. Proponents of this metaphor felt that the Internet, like
the Wild West, "beckoned to the imagination as a place unregulated
and uncivilized, whose inhabitants lived beyond the reach of law and
the constraints of polite behavior."1 6 The Internet was attractive be-
cause of its inherent lawlessness 17 -a principle a few courts even ac-
knowledged. For example, in ACLU v. Reno, the court commented
that "the strength of the Internet is ... chaos" and rested its holding
on the theory that "the strength of our liberty depends upon the
chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech the First Amendment
protects." 18
12 Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2003, H.R. 2517, 108th Cong. (2003).
13 Id. §3.
14 Id § 3(2).
15 SeeJonathanJ. Rusch, Cyberspace & the "Deuil's Hatband", 24 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 577,
577 (2000).
16 Id. at 579 (quoting TED MORGAN, A SHOVEL OF STARS: THE MAKIING OF THE AMERI-
CAN WEST 1800 TO THE PRESENT 13 (1995)).
17 Id.
18 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996), afrd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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Congress does not find this analogy to be so promising, reasoning
that the Wild West metaphor is a perfect argument for imposing new
regulations.19 Congress asserts that regulation is necessary to protect
businesses and citizens from this lawless frontier.20 Recently, Con-
gress targeted the unauthorized electronic transmission of copy-
righted materials, in part because of substantial pressure by the
recording industry to constrain the widespread phenomenon of MP3
file sharing.2 '
This recent phenomenon is largely attributable to advances in
digital compression technology that facilitates the storage of audio re-
cordings in small MP3 files. 22 Although MP3 files are not perfect cop-
ies of the original audio recording, their small size make them well
suited for transmission over the Internet.2 3 Individuals can acquire
MP3 files in two ways. The first method is by using "ripping" software
to extract and compress a digital copy of a compact disc (CD), which
can then be stored on the user's computer.24 Alternatively, an individ-
ual may download MP3 files from an internet file sharing service.25 In
addition, increased Internet connection speeds and reduced com-
puter storage costs have facilitated the ease of music file transfer.26
There are a number of different types of file sharing services.
Some services, such as the original Napster, operate through use of
centralized servers.2 7 The file sharing program acquires a list of avail-
able MP3 files on the hard drives of individual users and conveys this
information to other users who are searching for these files. 28 If an
individual wishes to download a file from a user, the service gives the
acquiring individual's computer the internet address of the person
possessing the file. 29 This, in turn, allows the individual's computer to
connect to the other user's computer to transfer the file. 30
19 See Rusch, supra note 15, at 578.
20 See id. at 580.
21 SeeCory Rayburn, AfterNapster, 6 VA.J.L. & TECH. 16, 34 (2001);Jeremy Paul Sirota,
Note, Analog to Digital: Harnessing Peer Computing, 55 HASTINcS L.J. 759, 770-71 (2004).
22 See Jennifer Norman, Note, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industy Survive Peer-to-
Peer?, 26 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTs 371, 373 (2003).
23 See id. As a result of their small size, MP3 files can be quickly transferred between
individuals. See id.
24 d. "Ripping" is the term used to describe the extraction of audio files from a CD.
Ripping may also be referred to as digital audio extraction (DAE). See id. at 373 n.9.
25 Id. at 373.
26 See id. (citing DRM Systems Doomed to Fail, CONSuMER ELEcrRONics, Dec. 2, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 9690018).
27 See id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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"Pure" peer-to-peer file sharing services, such as Kazaa, Mor-
pheus, and Gnutella, operate without the use of a central server.31
When a user logs on to this service, he or she connects to other com-
puters directly.3 2 The user's computer then, without the aid of a cen-
tralized master list, searches all of the other users' computers for the
requested file. 33 Thus, all data exchanges are solely between the indi-
vidual computers. 34
In 1998, Congress responded to the increased swapping of copy-
righted files by enacting the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 35 The
DMCA was Congress's attempt to modernize U.S. copyright law36 and
was promulgated for two primary reasons: (1) to appease copyright
owners' fears that their material would be spread across the entire
digital community,3 7 and (2) to affirm the ratification of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties.3 8
Title I of the DMCA implements the WIPO treaties in two ways.39
First, the DMCA prohibits the circumvention of copyright protection
systems and provides that "[n]o person shall circumvent a technologi-
cal measure that effectively controls access to a [copyrighted] work
protected under this title. '40 The statute also bans the manufacture,
sale, distribution, or trafficking of tools and technologies that make
such circumvention possible.41 As a second means of incorporating
the WIPO treaties, Title I also prohibits the removal of copyright man-
agement information. 42 Certain organizations, such as nonprofit li-
braries and educational institutions, are exempt from some of the
31 See id.
32 Id.
" SeeJohn Borland, The P2P Myth: Democracy's TrafficJams, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 26,
2000, at http://news.com.com/2009-1023-247379.html.
34 Id.; see infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
35 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1998)). The Act is also known as the WIPO
Treaty Implementing Legislation. See The Anti-DMCA Website, Frequently Asked Ques-
tions (FAQ), at http://anti-dmca.org/faq-local.html (last updated Sept. 7, 2001).
36 EDUCAUSE Current Issues, DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act), at http://
www.educause.edu/Browse/654&PARENT-ID= 254 (last updated Feb. 14, 2005).
37 See supra notes 1-4.
38 WIPO is an international organization with 181 member states dedicated to pro-
moting the use and protection of intellectual property. The organization administers
twenty-three international treaties that require member states to enforce certain copyright
laws in their own countries. See World Intellectual Property Organization, About WIPO, at
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2004). For a more thorough
review of the WIPO treaties, see GRAHAM J H SMITH, INTERNET LAW AND REGULATION 15-16
(3d ed. 2002).
39 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 1201, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1998)).
40 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).
41 Id. §§ 1201 (a) (2), 1201(b).
42 See id.
1089
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
provisions. 43 Title I also imposes both civil and criminal liability on
violators. 44
Title II of the DMCA is entitled "The Online Copyright Infringe-
ment Liability Limitation Act" and addresses the copyright liability of
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). 45 If an ISP complies with certain
prerequisites, it will not be liable for monetary damages for various
copyright infringement claims. 46 Compliance also limits equitable
and injunctive relief 47
Title II specifically enumerates four limitations on IPS liability.
Section 512(a) addresses ISP liability for the transmission of infring-
ing material over its network. 48 Section 512(b) refers to liability for
system caching, which in this sense refers to "the intermediate and
temporary storage of material on a system or network" controlled by
the ISP. 4 9 Section 512(c) covers liability for copyrighted information
that "resides on a system or network" controlled by the ISP. 50 Finally,
section 512(d) discusses liability for providing information location
tools, such as directories, indexes, references, pointers, or hypertext
links. 5'
To qualify for any of these safe harbor provisions, the ISP must
have a policy for terminating repeat offenders and notify account
holders of this policy.5 2 The ISP must also accommodate and not in-
terfere with "standard technical measures," defined as those measures
"used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works."53
Some of the specific safe harbors have additional requirements. For
example, to avoid liability under sections 512(c) and 512(d), the ISP
must not have actual knowledge of the infringement or be "aware of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent. 54
In addition, the ISP must not receive direct financial benefits from the
infringing activity.55 Further, to avoid liability under sections 512(b),
512(c), and 512(d), the ISP must be able to remove or prevent access
to material claimed to be in violation of the DMCA.56
43 Id. § 1201(d).
44 Id. §§ 1203, 1204.
45 This is a broad category, which includes Internet ISPs (ISPs), Online ISPs (OSPs),
search engines, portals, and even owners of corporate intranets. See Ian C. Ballon, Internet
and Electronic E-Commerce Law: A Primer, 1367 PLI/CoRps 431, 474-75 (2003).
46 Id. at 475.
47 Id.
48 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000).
49 See id. § 512(b) (1).
50 Id. §512(c)(1).
51 Id. § 512(d).
52 Id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
53 Id § 512(i) (2).
54 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A) (i)-(ii), (d) (1) (A)-(B).
55 Id. §512 (c) (1) (B), (d) (2).
56 Id. §512 (b) (2) (E), (c) (1) (c), (d) (3).
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In addition to limiting the liability of ISPs, Title II also adds an-
other important provision. Section 512(h) provides that "[a] copy-
right owner or a person authorized to act on the owner's behalf may
request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a sub-
poena to [an ISP] for identification of an alleged infringer in accor-
dance with this subsection. '57 To receive the subpoena, the affected
party must file: (1) a copy of the Section 512(c) noticeSx (2) a pro-
posed subpoena, and (3) a sworn declaration. 59 Upon receipt of the
subpoena, the service provider must "expeditiously disclose.., infor-
mation sufficient to identify the alleged infringer.
60
B. Seven Years Later: Reflections on the DMCA
Although the DMCA may aid in limiting the illegal distribution of
copyrighted materials over the Internet, critics argue that the Act does
so by sacrificing other legitimate interests. For example, critics claim
that the DMCA impinges on free speech6 1 and allows copyright own-
ers to override fair use rights. 6
2
Those who feel that the DMCA restricts free speech have compel-
ling stories to support their argument. The case of Dmitry Sklyarov is
a useful example. Sklyarov was a Russian programer who worked for a
company called ElcomSoft.6 3 While working at Elcomsoft, Sklyarov
helped author the Advanced eBook Processor (AEBPR) software. 64
This software allows Adobe eBook owners to translate their eBook
software from Adobe's secure format to Portable Document Format
(PDF).65 However, one must own the eBook legally for the software
to work. 66 AEBPR has several beneficial uses. For example, the
software has been used to convert eBook files into PDF files compati-
57 Id. § 512(h)(1).
58 Id. § 512(h)(2)(A).
59 Id. §512(h)(2)(B)-(C).
60 Id. § 512(h) (3). The ISP is only required to disclose such information to the extent
that it is available to them. Id.
61 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 420-22 (1999); Alfred C. Yen, Internet
Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First
Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1888-89 (2000);Jennifer L. Livingston, Note, Free Speech and
Fair Use: The DeCSS Dilemma Resolved?, 71 U. CoN. L. REv. 1117, 1139 (2003) ("The DMCA is
the very model of a content-based unconstitutional restriction on free speech.").
62 See infra notes 79-82.
63 Campaign for Digital Rights, Dmitry Sklyarov FAQ at http://ukcdr.org/issues/skly-
arov (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
64 Free Dmitry Sklyarov!, Background & Status, at http://www.freesklyarov.org (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2005).
65 Id.; see Campaign for Digital Rights, supra note 63.
66 Free Dmitry Sklyarov!, supra note 64.
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ble with electronic readers for the blind,67 and it has been used to
move eBooks to different computers. 6
Although AEBPR software is legal in Russia,69 Adobe took issue
with its use in the United States. On July 17, 2001, after presenting his
program at a Las Vegas computer security conferece, Sklyarov was ar-
rested and charged with "distributing a product designed to circum-
vent copyright protection measures" in violation of the DMCA. 70
After organizations such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation pres-
sured Adobe, 71 Adobe requested that the FBI drop the charges against
Sklyarov7 2 and federal prosecutors backed off when Sklyarov agreed to
testify against ElcomSoft. 73 In the first criminal case tried under the
DMCA, a jury acquitted ElcomSoft of all charges.7 4
Another case DMCA opponents cite involves John Alex Halder-
man. Halderman, a Princeton University student, discovered that
SunnComm Technologies' CD-3 copy-protection software could be
disabled by pressing the "shift" key while loading the CD into a com-
puter.75 After posting a paper detailing his findings on his website,76
SunnComm threatened to sue under the DMCA. 77  Ultimately,
SunnComm relented on its threat to sue, though some observers be-
67 Id.; see Campaign for Digital Rights, supra note 63.
68 See Free Dmitry Sklyarovl, supra note 64. The author of this source suggests that
this behavior is no different from someone creating a copy of a CD that he or she owns for
use in his or her car. Id. It is important to note, however, that it could also be used to
create copies for other individuals who did not purchase the product.
69 Campaign for Digital Rights, supra note 63.
70 Free Dmitry Sklyarov!, supra note 64. "As is usual practice for the computer secur-
it' profession, his lecture was delivered from the perspective of exposing flaws in Adobe's
access-restriction technology." Campaign for Digital Rights, supra note 63.
71 "EFF is a nonprofit group of passionate people-lawyers, technologists, volunteers,
and visionaries-working to protect your digital rights." Electronic Frontier Foundation,
Electronic Frontier Foundation: Defending Freedom in the Digital World, What is the
EFF?, at http://www.eff.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
72 Campaign for Digital Rights, supra note 63.
73 Lisa M. Bowman, ElcomSoft Verdict: Not Guilty, CNET NEwS.coM, Dec. 17, 2002, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-978176.html?tagNL.
74 Id. Jury foreman Dennis Strader later stated that the jury believed ElcomSoft's
software was illegal, but acquitted the company because they agreed the company had not
intended to violate the law: "We didn't understand why a million-dollar company would
put on their Web page an illegal thing that would [ruin] their whole business if they were
caught." Id. (alteration in original). Strader also stated that the jury found the DMCA to
be confusing, leading them to believe that Russian executives likely could not understand
it. Id.
75 John C. Dvorak, Free Speech at Risk, PC MAGAZINE, Oct. 13, 2003, available at http://
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,4149,1335801,00.asp.
76 J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the MediaMax CD3 Copy-Prevention Systemn (Oct. 6,
2003), at http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-jhalderm/cd3 (last updated June 21, 2004).
77 Dvorak, supra note 75.
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lieve this was only because the case proved too "ridiculous" to pursue
and would have reflected poorly on the DMCA.
78
Many critics also feel that the DMCA allows copyright owners to
override fair use rights. 7 9 Under traditional fair use doctrine, individ-
uals are allowed to make incidental copies of copyrighted material
without first obtaining the consent of the copyright owner.80 Some
critics believe the fair use doctrine no longer applies in the electronic
arena.81 For example, many CD manufacturers now use "copy-pro-
tected" CDs, which prevent even those who legally purchased a CD
from making legitimate back-up copies of it.82 Additionally, the maga-
zine 2600, a leading publication in the computer hacking commu-
nity,83 was forbidden from placing a link on its website to another site
78 Id. Some critics of the DCMA wished that SunnComm had pressed charges against
Halderman to bring attention to this "absurd law." Id. Indeed, comments SunnComm
CEO Peter Jacobs made also support the argument that the case against Halderman was
ridiculous:
Jacobs said in an interview .. .that a successful lawsuit would do little to
reverse the damage done by the paper Halderman published ... about his
research, and any suit would likely hurt the research community by making
computer scientists think twice about researching copy-protection technol-
ogy. "I don't want to be the guy that creates any kind of chilling effect on
research," Jacobs said.
Fred "Zamboni" Locklear, SunnComm Shifts Stance, Backs Away From Lawsuit, Ars TECHNICA,
Oct. 10, 2003, at http://arstechnica.com/news/posts/1065816462.html. An interesting
point is that these comments appeared to directly conflict with onesJacobs made the previ-
ous day, suggesting that Jacobs may have initially underestimated the possible effects of
bringing suit:
This cat-and-mouse game that hackers and others like to play with owners
of digital property is over. No matter what their credentials or rationale, it
is wrong to use one's knowledge and the cover of academia to facilitate
piracy and theft of digital property. SunnComm is taking a stand here be-
cause we believe that those who own property, whether physical or digital,
have the ultimate authority over how their property is used.
Press Release, SunComm, SunnComm CEO Says Princeton Report Critical of its MediaMax
CD Copy Management Technology Contains Erroneous Assumptions and Conclusions
(Oct. 9, 2003), at http://www.sunncomm.com/press/pressrelcase.asp?prid= 2 0 0 310091
000.
79 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1998) ("[T he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including mul-
tiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.").
80 Rick Boucher, Time to Rewrite the DMCA, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 29, 2002, at http://
news.com.com/2010-1071-825335.html. Back-up copies of copyrighted material, such as
CDs or DVDs can serve such purposes as: (1) backing-up one's investment in the product,
(2) allowing for maximum use of the product, and (3) restoring damaged disks. See Protect
Fair Use, No Playing: Your Fair Use Rights, at http://www.protectfairuse.org/archive/con-
sumers/now-playing.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
81 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Five Years Under the
DMCA, at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintended consequences.php (last visited Mar.
1, 2005).
82 Id.
83 See http://www.2600.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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that displayed code that could be used to disable copy-protection
software on DVDs.8 4 Some of these critics are worried that this pat-
tern of behavior will ultimately lead to the demise of "free" informa-
tion in places like public libraries.85
Others argue that the DMCA "impedes competition and innova-
tion" and serves as an "all-purpose ban on access to computer net-
works." 6 Regardless of these criticisms, the DMCA appears to be here
to stay. The Act has thus far withstood all constitutional challenges.8 7
Moreover, Congress supports the Act,88 though they have proposed
minor changes to appease the DMCA's more strident critics.8 9 Addi-
tionally, a federal jury recently became the first to convict someone
under the DMCA9 0-a sign that at least a few are willing to enforce
the Act. Nevertheless, while the public may appear willing to enforce
the DMCA in certain situations, they seem less willing to do so in
84 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 346 (S.D.N.Y.
2000). The disabling of the copy-protection software is necessary to play DVDs on a Linux-
based operating system. See Boucher, supra note 80.
85 See, e.g., Boucher, supra note 80 (
A time may soon come when what is available for free on library shelves will
only be available on a pay-per-use basis. It would be a simple matter for a
copyright owner to impose a requirement that a small fee be paid each time
a digital book or video documentary is accessed by a library patron. Even
the student who wants even the most basic access to only a portion of the
book to write a term paper would have to pay to avoid committing a crime.
). For an interesting article on fair use rights and the DMCA, see Stephanie L. Kimbro,
Opening the Door to Fair Use in the Digital Millenium Copyright Act by Allowing Fair
Circumvention and Dissemination of Circumvention Devices (Apr. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.etaoin.org/slk/paper/dmca fair-use.pdf.
86 Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 81. While it is important to briefly out-
line various criticisms of the DMCA in order to demonstrate its potentially rocky future,
this Note focuses on private versus institutional enforcement of the DMCA. Thus, a more
thorough probe of the criticisms of the DMCA is unnecessary, as its legal validity is a neces-
sary presumption for purposes of this Note.
87 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding
that an injunction to prohibit the posting of DVD decryption software neither substantially
oppressed more speech than necessary to further the government's interest nor unconsti-
tutionally impinged on fair use rights); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that the DMCA is not overbroad, vague, nor an unconstitutional
restriction of speech).
88 See How the DMCA Affects Us ("The law is performing the way we hoped.") (quot-
ing Rep. Howard Coble, Chairman of the House Judiciary's Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property), at http://www.cryogenius.com/dmca.hun.
89 See, e.g., Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2003) (addressing the issue of copy-protected CDs).
90 See Paul Festa, Jury Convicts Man in DMCA Case, CNET NEws.CoM, Sept. 23, 2003
(discussing the jury verdict against Thomas Michael Whitehead, who was convicted of sell-
ing hardware that could access DirecTV satellite broadcasts without paying for them.
Three of the six felony counts he was convicted of were DMCA violations. He now faces up
to thirty years in federal prison and fines of as much as $2.75 million), available at http://
news.com.com/2100-1025_3-5080807.html.
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others.9 1 Such inconsistency hardens attempts to enforce the Act, es-
pecially in the case of MP3 filesharing.
II
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DMCA
Private enforcement of the DMCA has not been easy. Much of
the difficulty exists because society has tended to regard the behavior
the DMCA criminalizes as acceptable. 92 Although the thought of
stealing a CD from a store is unacceptable, the act of file sharing,
much like copying a CD at home, does not carry the same stigma.93
Moreover, the ease with which information may be shared over the
Internet poses serious problems for enforcement of copyright laws
such as the DMCA.94 Complicating matters further, advances in peer-
to-peer technology have eliminated many intermediaries, such as ISPs,
which has the effect of eroding the "gatekeeper" function in-
termediaries played in enforcing copyright laws.
A. Initial Strategy: Going After the Corporate "Big Guns"
At first, private entities, such as the RIAA, attempted to enforce
the DMCA by going after companies that programmed or operated
the peer-to-peer file sharing software used by millions to swap MP3
files. 95 The first (and most popular) file sharing service the recording
industry attacked was Napster.9 6 Although Napster was often referred
to as a peer-to-peer service, it did not technically operate as such.
97
Napster's system was hierarchal in nature-all user searches passed
between the user and Napster's central server.9 8 In other words, when
a Napster user ran a search, the search request would pass directly
through Napster's centralized servers, which in turn would inform the
user of other users who had the file he desired.9 9 By contrast, with
91 See infra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
92 See Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. Rav. 679, 723 (2003).
93 See id.
94 See SMITH, supra note 38, at 13-14. "[T]he Internet provides a vast, inexpensive,
and potentially anonymous way to commit unlawful acts." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET: A REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET (Mar. 2000), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm (quoted in Michael L. Rustad,
63 Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier, S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 63
(2001)).
95 Norman, supra note 22, at 373 ("[A]lthough no content is stored on, or passed
through the central server, the centralized system arguably facilitates file sharing."); see Part
I.A.
96 See Norman, supra note 22, at 374.
97 See Howard Siegel & Benjamin Semel, Combating Online Infringement Post-Napster,
N.J. L.J., Oct. 1, 2001, at 29, 29.
98 See id.
99 See id.
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true, or "pure," peer-to-peer networks, all user queries are conducted
between the individual users without the use of a central server.100
Each user request independently searches the list of files that every
other user is currently sharing on the network, and the software then
pairs that user up with another from whom the requested file could be
downloaded. 10 1
Napster distributed its file sharing software for free over the In-
ternet via the company's website. 10 2 The software allowed users to
share MP3 files with other users logged-on to the server without pay-
ing each other, Napster, or the copyright owners. 0 3 Although most
of the music files transferred were copyrighted works, Napster never
attempted to obtain authorization for such transfers from the owners
of the copyrighted material.10 4 Napster did not collect fees from its
users, but the centralized peer-to-peer file sharing service was worth
an estimated 60 to 80 million dollars. 10 5
Various commercial recording corporations, including A & M
Records, sued Napster alleging that its operation of a music file shar-
ing service constituted contributory and vicarious copyright infringe-
ment.1 0 6 Napster defended by claiming that its users were making fair
use of the copyrighted works. 10 7 For example, Napster stated that
users were using its service for "space-shifting," or moving legally ob-
tained content from one device to another, such as from a CD to a
computer or MP3 player.'0 8 In addition, Napster used the affirmative
defense of substantial noninfringing use. 10 9 The Napster Court noted
that in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Su-
100 Id.
101 See id.
The query process and the list of results can look remarkably similar to
Napster, and yet all of it can be accomplished without any reference to a
central computer. Indeed, on true P2P networks, it is impossible to filter or
block material from being swapped because there is no single place on the
network to install a filter through which everything passes.
102 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 903. A sample taken by A & M's expert revealed that eighty-seven percent of
the sampled pieces were copyrighted. Id. Antipiracy counsel for the RIAA found that A &
M owned copyrights to more than seventy percent of the files sampled. Id.
105 Id. at 902. The company did have future plans to profit from the service. "Poten-
tial revenue sources include targeted email; advertising; commissions from links to com-
mercial websites; and direct marketing of CDs, Napster products, and CD burners and
tippers." Id. In addition, Napster considered charging fees for premium versions of the
software. Id.
106 Id. at 900.
107 See generally supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (providing background on
the fair use doctrine).
108 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
109 Id. at 912. This defense is also known as the "staple article of commerce doctrine."
Id.
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preme Court held that a "manufacturer is not liable for selling a 'sta-
ple article of commerce' that is 'capable of commercially significant
noninfringing uses. "110 The Sony Court also observed that "[a] ny in-
dividual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use;' the copy-
right owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a use."'
The District Court of the Northern District of California rejected
all of Napster's affirmative defenses and granted the plaintiffs' motion.
for a preliminary injunction, which required Napster to shut down its
service.' 1 2 The court analyzed Napster's fair use argument under the
four main factors codified in Section 107 of the Copyright Act'1 3 and
determined that Napster's users were not engaging in fair use." 4 The
court also found that "space-shifting" only accounted for a "de minimis
portion of Napster use."" 5 Finally, the court refused to extend the
Sony doctrine to Napster because Napster failed to show that space-
shifting constituted a "commercially significant use of Napster." 6
The court also held that the plaintiffs' claims of contributory and
vicarious liability were reasonably likely to succeed on the merits.11 7
The court found that Napster possessed actual knowledge that its
users were illegally transferring copyrighted materials" 8 and that Nap-
ster materially contributed to the infringing activities."1 9 The court
110 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)). The Seventh Circuit, however, has declined to follow the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Sony doctrine, thus leading to the current split be-
tween the two circuits. See supra note 7.
131 Sony, 464 U.S. at 433.
112 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 896. The court found that there was a reasonable likeli-
hood that the plaintiffs' claim would succeed on the merits. Id.
113 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002). The four factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
114 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912-15.
115 Id. at 904.
116 Id. at 916
[T]he most credible explanation for the exponential growth of traffic to
the website is the vast array of free MP3 files offered by other users-not the
ability of each individual to space-shift misic she already owns. Thus, even
if space-shifting is a fair use, it is not substantial enough to preclude liability
under the staple article of commerce doctrine.
117 Id. at 918-22.
118 Id. at 918-19. The court held that this finding of actual knowledge precluded Nap-
ster from claiming relief under the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA, and that Napster
failed to demonstrate that subsection 512(d) of the DMCA shelters contributory infringers.
Id. at 919 n.24; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (1) (A), 512(d) (1) (B) (2000) (stating that the ISP
must not have actual or constructive knowledge of infringing activity).
119 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919-20.
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held that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on their vicarious liability
challenge because Napster had "the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such
activities." 120
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, though the Court
of Appeals remanded the case because its analysis was different in
some regards. 12  The Court of Appeals was unwilling to accept the
lower court's holding that Napster's potential contributory and vicari-
ous infringement liability precluded the application of the DMCA safe
harbors)12 2 The Ninth Circuit did, however, state that the plaintiffs
raised significant questions regarding the applicability of the safe har-
bor provisions, including:
(1) whether Napster is an Internet ISP [sic] as defined by 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(d); (2) whether copyright owners must give a ISP "official"
notice of infringing activity in order for it to have knowledge or
awareness of infringing activity on its system; and (3) whether Nap-
ster complies with § 512(i), which requires a ISP to timely establish
a detailed copyright compliance policy.
123
Unfortunately, these questions were never answered because the law-
suit was automatically stayed when Napster filed for bankruptcy pro-
tection in June of 2002.124
At first, this ruling appeared to be a major victory for the RIAA
because it appeared that mass distribution of data was not possible
without centralized file sharing services. 125 This was, for a time, cor-
rect. Following the closing of Napster, many users flocked to the new
"pure" peer-to-peer file sharing services. 126 The result was an Internet
"traffic jam."127 Without the aid of a central server, the individual
users' computers were forced to process the search requests that were
120 Id. at 920 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir.
1996)). The court held that Napster can "police its service" since it possesses the ability to
block users. Id. at 920-21. The court also found that Napster would derive revenues "di-
rectly from increases in [its] userbase." Id. at 921.
121 SeeA & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth
Circuit disagreed with some of the reasoning that the district court employed in its analysis
of Napster's contributory and vicarious liability. See id. at 1019-24. However, the Court of
Appeals ultimately affirmed the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs demonstrated
a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 1022-24. The Court of Appeals remanded for
a modified preliminary injunction in accordance with its reasoning. Id. at 1029. The mod-
ified injunction was subsequently affirmed on appeal. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002).
122 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
123 Id.
124 Jim Hu, Napster: Gimme Shelter in Chapter 11, CNET NEws.coM, June 3, 2002, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-930467.html?tag=vn.
125 See Borland, supra note 33.
126 See id.
127 See id.
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once handled by huge centralized servers.128 Thus, under the pure
peer-to-peer services, "the network was only as strong-and as fast-as
its weakest links."' 2 9
Over time, however, Internet connection speeds increased, thus
making pure peer-to-peer services as efficient, if not more so, than
their centralized predecessors. Copyright owners therefore had a new
problem on their hands: a growing network of "pure" peer-to-peer file
sharing services. Many recording companies, together with movie
producing companies, sued some of these new services in an attempt
to shut them down, as they had with Napster. The effectiveness of this
approach is yet to be determined, as the circuits are currently split
over whether liability should attach to these software creators for their
users' infringing practices. 130 The Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari to resolve the dispute.'
The two main cases exemplifying the opposing views are Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokstert 32 in the Ninth Circuit and In re
Aimster Copyright Litigation in the Seventh Circuit.'3 3 In Grokster, the
plaintiffs attempted to employ the same arguments they did in Nap-
ster.1 - 4 Although the Ninth Circuit did find that some users of the
defendants' products were engaged in direct copyright infringe-
ment, 3 5 the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment or-
der for the defendants on both the contributory and vicarious liability
claims.136 On the contributory infringement claim, the Ninth Circuit
stated that while direct infringement is a requirement for contributory
liability, it must also be established that the defendants had "knowl-
edge of the infringement" and materially contributed to the infringe-
ment.137 To satisfy the knowledge requirement, the defendants must
have had "reasonable knowledge of specific infringement."' 38 In
other words, the defendants must have had "'specific knowledge of
128 See id.
129 Id.
130 Compare Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding that defendants are not liable for contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004), with In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334
F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that Internet website operators can be held liable for
contributory and vicarious infringement), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
131 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
132 380 F.3d 1154 (9h Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
133 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
134 See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160.
135 See id.
136 Id. at 1167.
137 Id. at 1160.
138 Id. at 1162. The Ninth Circuit found that this elevated standard applied because
the defendants sufficiently demonstrated that their products were capable of "substantial
noninfringing uses." Id. Thus, unlike in Napster, the Sony doctrine applied. See Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). If the defendants failed to demon-
strate this, the plaintiffs would only have needed to show that the defendants possessed
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infringement at a time at which they contribute [d] to the infringe-
ment, and . . . fail[ed] to act upon that information.' 1 3 9
Unlike in Napster, the Ninth Circuit in Grokster determined that
neither of the defendants materially contributed to the infringe-
ment. 140 The Ninth Circuit distinguished the case from Napster, rea-
soning that the defendants in Grokster did not provide the "'site and
facilities' for infringement" as the defendants in Napster had. 14 1 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit declined to hold the defendants liable for contribu-
tory infringement primarily because they operated on a more "pure"
peer-to-peer format.' 4 2
On the issue of vicarious infringement, the Ninth Circuit found
that the defendants derived a financial benefit from the infringing
conduct. 143 But it ultimately determined that the defendants were not
liable for vicarious infringement because they did not possess the
right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct. 14 4 As evidence of
this, the Ninth Circuit cited the services' inability to prevent access by
individual users, as well as their lack of centralized search indexes and
mandatory registration systems-all of which Napster possessed. 145
The defendants' failure to control its users, or to make the software
such that its chances of being unlawfully used were minimized, were
irrelevant in determining whether there is vicarious liability. 14 6
constructive knowledge of the infringement. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1161. This interpreta-
tion of the Sony doctrine ultimately led to the split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.
139 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2003)).
140 Id. at 1163.
141 Id. ("Infringing messages or file indices do not reside on defendants' computers,
nor do defendants have the ability to suspend user accounts." (quoting Grokster, 259 F.
Supp. 2d at 1037, 1039-41)).
142 See id. (
[U] nder both StreamCast's decentralized, Gnutella-type network and Grok-
ster's quasi-decentralized, supernode, Kazaa-type network, no central index
is maintained. Indeed, at present, neither StreamCast nor Grokster main-
tains control over index files . . . . [E]'en if the Software Distributors
"closed their doors and deactivated all computers within their control,
users of their products could continue sharing files with little or no
interruption."
(quoting Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041)).
143 Id. at 1164. Both StreamCast and Grokster derived substantial revenue from adver-
tising: "[B]ecause a substantial number of users download the software to acquire copy-
righted material, a significant proportion of Defendants' advertising revenue depends
upon the infringement." See Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1044.
144 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164-66.
145 See id. at 1165; see also A & M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir.
2001) (stating that the -ability to block infringers' access to a particular environment for
any reason whatsoever is evidence of the right and ability to supervise" the infringing
conduct).
146 See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1166 ("We agree with the district court that possibilities for
upgrading software located on another person's computer are irrelevant to determining
whether vicarious liability exists.").
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Grokster appears to exonerate pure peer-to-peer software manu-
facturers of any secondary liability for actions committed by users with
respect to copyright infringement. Indeed, the district court in Grok-
ster acknowledged that it was "not blind to the possibility that [the]
Defendants may have intentionally structured their businesses to avoid
secondary liability for copyright infringement, while benefiting finan-
cially from the illicit draw of their wares."' 47 As the Ninth Circuit later
pointed out, however, "it is prudent for courts to exercise caution
before restructuring liability theories for the purpose of addressing
specific market abuses, despite their apparent present magnitude.' 14
For the Ninth Circuit, resolution of this problem is best left to the
legislature.' 49
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit expressed a differ-
ent view in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation.150 The facts of Aimster are
similar to those in Grokster-owners of copyrighted music files brought
suit against Aimster, a third-party program which was used to swap
files through America Online's Instant Messaging service. 15' In Aim-
ster, the dispute was whether the Aimster service utilized a Napster-like
centralized database, as the plaintiffs claimed, or a more Grokster-like
decentralized service, as the defendant asserted. 152 The district court
quickly brushed aside this distinction, which many had thought was
central to these cases, stating that its reasoning in the case "would
hold regardless of whether or not Aimster maintains a central
database of files available for transfer."'153 The district court went on
to grant the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on the
grounds that the plaintiffs "had demonstrated a likelihood of prevail-
ing on the merits ... with respect to vicarious as well as contributory
infringement."'154 The injunction effectively shut down the Aimster
service until the merits of the case were decided. 155
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion to enter the "broad" preliminary injunction against the defen-
dant.156 Unlike the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Sony doctrine
in Napster and Grokster, the Seventh Circuit held that the mere capabil-
ity of a product or service to have substantial noninfringing uses is
147 Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
148 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1167.
149 See id.
150 In reAimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1107 (2004).
151 See id. at 645-46.
152 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 641 n.6 (N.D. 111. 2002),
aff d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
153 See id.
154 See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646.
155 Id. at 645.
156 Id. at 656.
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insufficient to defeat a claim of contributory infringement.1 5 7 Accord-
ing to the Seventh Circuit, in order to escape a claim of contributory
infringement, the Sony doctrine requires not only a showing of possible
substantial noninfringing use, but also a strong showing that the
software is primarily used for noninfringing purposes. 58 Noting that
"Aimster has failed to produce any evidence that its service has ever
been used for a noninfringing use, let alone evidence concerning the
frequency of such cases," the Seventh Circuit swiftly affirmed the dis-
trict court's order. 159
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in the Grokster
case. 160 If the Court adopts the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, the RIAA
would possess a highly-effective tool to enforce its property rights
under the DMCA. On the other hand, if the Court chooses to adopt
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, the RIAA may have to rethink its
enforcement strategy, though it appears to have already begun a new
enforcement approach.
B. A New Approach: Attacking Individual Users
To combat illegal file sharing, the RIAA has recently decided to
sue individual users of pure peer-to-peer file sharing programs. Real-
izing that it could not go after every user of such software, the RIAA
only subpoenaed heavy users who shared many files. These subpoe-
nas were issued to prevent these users from further sharing files, while
also instilling fear of prosecution in all other users.
The first wave of lawsuits came in September of 2003, when the
RJAA filed suit against 261 individuals. 16 ' The RIAA sued these indi-
viduals for as much as $150,000 per song that they allowed others to
download from them.' 1 2 Although the RIAA stated that it would file
thousands of additional lawsuits in the coming months,1 63 this did not
157 See id. at 653. "[W]hen a supplier is offering a product or service that has nonin-
fringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of the respective magnitude of these uses
is necessary for a finding of contributory infringement." Id. at 649.
158 See id. at 651, 653.
159 See id. at 653. The court was more hesitant with respect to the district court's ruling
on the likelihood of success on the vicarious liability claim, but nevertheless affirmed the
district court's ruling, largely because of its strong belief that the plaintiffs were very likely
to prevail on the merits with respect to the contributory infringement claim. See id. at
654-55.
160 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). The
Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 29, 2005 and a decision is expected this
June.
161 See CNN.com, Students Angry Over Music Pircy Suits (Sept. 11, 2003) [hereinafter
Students Angry], at http://www.cnn.com/2003/EDUCATION/09/10/lawsuits.reaction.
reut/index.html.
162 Id. The reason for such a high monetary amount is because of the tort remedies
available under the DMCA. See 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (1999).
163 See Students Angry, supra note 161.
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occur. In October of 2003, the RIAA filed eighty suits, 16 4 and an addi-
tional forty-one suits in December of 2003, raising the total to 382.165
At least 220 of these suits settled for amounts ranging from $2,500 to
$7,500 each. 1 6 6 This pattern continued in January of 2004, when the
RIAA brought four lawsuits that targeted 532 alleged infringers. 167 It
appears that this strategy of periodically filing lawsuits against small
clusters of individuals will continue for the time being.
One way in which the RIAA sought to obtain the identity of al-
leged individual infringers was through use of the DMCA's subpoena
provisions. 168 The strategy withstood its first challenge in In re Verizon
Internet Services, Inc.,169 where the RIAA sought the identity of a Ver-
izon Internet Service user who allegedly allowed others to download
over 600 songs from his computer in one day.170 The RJAA served a
subpoena upon Verizon under Section 512(h) of the DMCA to deter-
mine the identity of the user.17' Verizon refused to comply, claiming
that the subpoena only "relate[d] to material transmitted over Ver-
izon's network, not stored on it, and thus [fell] outside the scope of
the subpoena power authorized in the DMCA. 1 , 72 The RJAA coun-
tered by arguing that the subpoena power under the DMCA applies to
all ISPs, regardless of "whether the infringing material is stored on or
simply transmitted over the ISP's network."173
The district court resolved the question in favor of the RIAA, or-
dering Verizon to disclose the identity of the alleged infringer.174 Fol-
lowing this victory, the RIAA served Verizon with another subpoena to
disclose the identity of another individual allegedly sharing many
copyrighted files. Once again, the district court held that this was a
valid exercise of Section 512(h)'s subpoena power.1 75 Verizon ap-
pealed both of these orders and the D.C. Circuit reversed, reasoning
that "a subpoena may be issued only to an ISP engaged in storing on
164 See CNN.com, 41 More Sued Over Music Downloads (Dec. 4, 2003), at http://
www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internetl2/04/downloading.music.ap.
165 Id.
166 See id.
167 David McGuire, RIAA Sues Song-Swapping Suspects, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Jan. 21,
2004, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn.pagenamearticle&contentd=
A35281-2004Jan21?language=printer.
168 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h); see also supra notes 57-60 (discussing the requirements of
the subpoena provision).
169 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D. D.C. 2003).
170 See id. at 26.
171 See id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id at 44-45.
175 In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 275 (D.D.C. 2003). The
court also held that Section 512(h) does not violate Article III of the Constitution or the
First Amendment. Id at 248-68.
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its servers material that is infringing or the subject of infringing activ-
ity."' 17 6 Thus, the Court of Appeals agreed with Verizon's initial con-
tention that such subpoenas are only available against violators of
Section 512(c) of the DMCA.177
It is uncertain how these recent rulings will affect the RIAA's new-
est strategy of suing individual users of file sharing programs. The
Verizon case does not appear to be fatal to the RIAA's recent efforts, as
it has continued to file lawsuits successfully against individual users.17 8
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that the RIAA's strategy is
being adopted even outside the United States. For example, Japanese
police, in a rare 2003 crackdown, arrested two individuals for file shar-
ing.179 Actions such as these suggest global cooperation in reducing
online copyright violations. Nevertheless, the RIAA and similar orga-
nizations are hesitant to file large numbers of lawsuits because of the
costs and negative publicity involved with suing individual infring-
ers. °8 0 Rather, these groups would prefer that the government assist
the enforcement effort, both in detecting violations of and enforcing
the DMCA. Thus far, it appears that the government is willing to offer
such assistance.
III
FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN DMCA ENFORCEMENT
A proposed bill entitled the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act
of 2003 would greatly increase the government's involvement in en-
forcing and detecting violations of the DMCA. 18 1 This proposed bill
operates under the premise that it is "important that Federal law en-
forcement agencies actively pursue criminals who steal the copy-
righted works of others, and prevent such activity through
176 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229,
1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
177 See id. at 1234-36.
178 See supra notes 166-68.
179 See CNN.com, Japan Police Arrest Two for File Sharing (Dec. 8, 2003), at http://
www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/12/08/sharing.arrests.ap/index.html.
180 For example, a recent story alleged that the RIAA incorrectly filed suit against a
seventy-nine year old man who then wrote a "handwritten note" to a federal judge explain-
ing that he neither owns a computer nor knows how to operate one. See Students Angry,
supra note 161. In addition, a recent survey indicates that two out of every three American
teens, a major demographic for record sales, oppose fines for music file sharing. See Press
Release, Harris Interactive, Two Out of Three American Teens Oppose Fines for Music File
Shares, Says Harris Interactive Youth Survey (Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Youth Survey],
available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=683.
181 Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2003, H.R. 2517, 108th Cong. (2003),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108-cong-bils&
docid=f:h2517ih.tx.pdf. The bill was proposed by Representatives Lamar Smith, Howard
Berman, and John Conyers.
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enforcement and awareness."' 8 2 The most important provision of the
bill directs the FBI to "develop a program to deter members of the
public from committing acts of copyright infringement."18 3 This pro-
gram would require the FBI to monitor and detect individuals who
are, without authorization, "offering on the Internet copies of copy-
righted works, or ... making copies of copyrighted works from the
Internet." 18 4 The FBI would then have to "issu[e] appropriate warn-
ings" indicating that such individuals "may be subject to criminal pros-
ecution."18t 5  In addition, the FBI would be responsible for
"facilitat[ing] the sharing among law enforcement agencies, Internet
service providers, and copyright owners of information" regarding
such activities.18 6 The Department of Justice would be required to
employ agents who are "train[ed] in the investigation and enforce-
ment of intellectual property crimes."' 8 7
The proposed bill also requires the Attorney General, in coordi-
nation with the Departments of Education and Commerce, to develop
an Internet Use Education Program to educate the public on the
value of copyrighted works and the ill effects of stealing such mate-
rial.' The program would inform the public of the "privacy, security,
and other risks of using the Internet to obtain unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works."'189 Finally, the bill requires the Attorney General
to develop criteria under which copyright owners can use the FBI seal
on physical and digital copies for deterrent purposes, 190 an effort the
FBI and RIAA began prior to this bill's proposal.19 1
Proponents of the bill, the RIAA being one of the largest, claim
that such legislation will "strengthen the hand" of agencies such as the
FBI to protect against online copyright infringement. 19 2 The bill's
proponents emphasize the softer aspects of the proposal, such as the
educational programs it would create and the use of the FBI seal on
copyrighted products. 193 Nevertheless, three significant problems
emerge from the proposal.
182 Id. § 2(7).
183 Id. § 3(1).
184 Id.
185 Id. § 3.
186 Id. § 3(2).
187 Id. § 4.
188 Id. § 5(b)(1).
189 Id. § 5(b)(2).
190 Id § 7.
191 For example, the FBI and recording industry have been working at producing an
FBI warning seal that can be used in the same way as it has been on videotapes, DVDs, and
movies for years. See Hearing, supra note 11.
192 See David Becker, New Bill Injects FBI into P2P Battle, CNET NEws.CoM, June 20,
2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-1019811.html.
193 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 11 (describing why the FBI supports the Act).
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First, the proposed legislation tends to "blur[ ] ... distinctions
between official prosecution of criminal acts and civil enforcement of
copyright provisions."' 94 This bill would require the FBI to become
more involved in private enforcement of the DMCA, while maintain-
ing the faCade that such participation is for criminal enforcement pur-
poses. 195 It permits the FBI to "scare a lot of users into thinking the
government is after them."' 96 In other words, the FBI would, through
the use of monitoring and issuing empty threats of criminal prosecu-
tion, privately enforce the DMCA in place of organizations such as the
RLAA. 197 Thus, the transaction costs of private enforcement of the
DMCA would shift from organizations such as the RIAA to the govern-
ment, and ultimately, taxpayers. Although private organizations like
the RIAA would benefit from the use of the FBI's "scare power," gov-
ernment enforcement of the DMCA is an inappropriate use of public
resources. 11s
Second, the proposed legislation requires the FBI to facilitate in-
formation sharing between law enforcement agencies, ISPs, and copy-
right owners. 199 Although it is clear that the RIAA and FBI would be
more than willing to share information, the same might not be true
for ISPs. Moreover, this may jeopardize privacy rights. For example,
the FBI, or possibly even the RIAA, might require ISPs to divulge the
personal information of its users whenever it wishes.200 The Verizon
case suggests that ISPs will not have to disclose this information. 20 1 In
that case, however, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the use of subpoenas
under the DMCA for user information only as a matter of statutory
interpretation. 20 2 Therefore, it would not be surprising for the same
Circuit to enforce similar disclosure requirements under this pro-
posed bill, as the language of the bill is much broader than that of the
DMCA,
Third, the bill establishes a major policing responsibility for the
FBI without providing clear guidelines explaining how the FBI is to
execute this new responsibility. In fact, discussion regarding the pro-
194 Becker, supra note 192.
195 See id.
196 Id.
197 The Act only requires the FBI to issue "warnings to individuals.., that they may be
subject to criminal prosecution." Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2003, H.R. 2517,
108th Cong. § 3 (2003) (emphasis added).
198 See infta Part IV.
199 SeeH.R. 2517 § 3(2).
200 See Becker, supra note 192.
201 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d
1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[A] subpoena may be issued only to an ISP engaged in
storing on its servers material that is infringing or the subject of infringing activity.").
202 See id.
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gram's development is limited to one sentence.2 0 3 At no point does
the bill ever address how the FBI is to identify potential violators; 20 4 it
only states that as part of the deterrence program, the FBI must issue
warnings to violators.2 0 5 From this, one can conclude that the bill re-
quires the FBI to monitor and detect potential violations of the
DMCA. While some statutes are vague when assigning a task to a fed-
eral agency to allow some agency discretion in implementing the bill,
the details of this proposed program should be more specifically ar-
ticulated given the controversial nature of the broad, yet important
task that this would impose on the FBI. In the absence of clear stan-
dards, the FBI might take the enforcement regime too far, or simply
not answer the call in the first place.
The Piracy Deterrence and Education Act is not the first piece of
controversial legislation Representative Howard Berman has proposed
that is designed to curb online music piracy. In 2002, Representative
Berman proposed legislation (the Berman Bill) to amend the U.S.
Copyright Law to relieve copyrighters of liability for "disabling, inter-
fering with, blocking, diverting, or otherwise impairing the unautho-
rized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction of his or her
copyrighted work on a publicly accessible peer-to-peer file trading net-
work."20 6 The only limitation was that such impairment could not
"without authorization, alter, delete, or otherwise impair the integrity
of any computer file or data residing on the computer of a file
trader."207
Under the Berman Bill, a copyright owner could cause damage of
up to $50 to an infringer's computer (not including damage to files
containing the copyrighted material).208 For a victim to bring a claim
for wrongful impairment, however, she would have to demonstrate
that she suffered an economic loss in excess of $250.209 In addition, a
user would need to show that the copyright owner "knowingly and
intentionally" impaired him without having a "reasonable basis" to be-
lieve that the user was conducting infringing conduct.2 10 The Berman
Bill may have had good intentions in granting copyright owners tech-
nological power to protect their works, but the bill failed to afford
sufficient protection to innocent victims. 2 11 This criticism applies
equally to the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2003. The
203 See H.R. 2517 § 3(1).
204 See id.
205 Id. § 3.
206 H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. § I(a) (2d Sess. 2002).
207 Id.
208 Id. § I(b)(1)(C),
209 Id. § 1(d).
210 Id.
211 See Norman, supra note 22, at 399-400.
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Berman Bill eventually died in committee-the same committee now
considering the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act. Hopefully
Berman's second attempt will suffer the same fate.
IV
WHY INCREASED INSTITUTIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN DMCA
ENFORCEMENT IS UNNECESSARY AND ALTERNATIVES FOR REQUIRED
EFFECTIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Despite the contentions of organizations such as the RIAA, en-
forcement of Internet copyright regulations is better left to the private
sector. The DMCA was enacted to "restore an eroding gatekeeper sys-
tem," which once permitted copyright owners to independently police
the few intermediaries who could access their work.2 12 The DMCA
provides private actors with a more than sufficient means of enforcing
their copyrights.
First, the DMCA may provide the means by which the RIAA can
simply shut down any file sharing service where unauthorized sharing
of copyrighted files takes place. This strategy proved effective with
Napster 213 and may, depending on how the Supreme Court rules,
hold true with the more modern pure peer-to-peer software.2 14 While
there may be no true way to effectively shut down these pure peer-to-
peer programs, if organizations such as the RIAA are able to bring
successful contributory and vicarious copyright infringement suits
against the manufacturers of such software, other manufacturers
would likely be deterred from producing such software in the future.
Regardless, the high reputational and transactional costs that the
RLAA and similar organizations incur through private enforcement
against individuals21 5 do not justify government intervention. Occa-
sionally, the RIAA must assume the "bad guy" role in the effort to run
its business effectively, and playing this role requires it to weigh the
costs and benefits behind the decision to pursue copyright infringers.
This calculus is similar to that made by retailers who must choose be-
tween protecting their product from theft and maintaining a positive
public image. One aspect of that calculus is setting acceptable loss
rates.
The government does not monitor individuals while they are at
retail outlets to prevent shoplifting. In such circumstances, the re-
212 Wu, supra note 92, at 741.
213 See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); supra Part
II.A.
214 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004); supra notes 131-61 and accompanying text.
215 Norman, supra note 22, at 392 ("Copyright owners have long avoided suing direct
infringers for file-sharing due to obvious concerns: the cost and the negative publicity asso-
ciated with filing multiple lawsuits against individual users would be overwhelming.").
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sponsibility to supervise the actions of customers rests with the individ-
ual outlet. If the store catches someone shoplifting, the store decides
how to handle the situation. The store may report the shoplifter to
the authorities if it so chooses, or it may privately reprimand the shop-
lifter. It is the store's responsibility to protect its own property,
though it ultimately has the support and aid of the criminal justice
system. Why should the government assume the active role of the pro-
tector simply because the offense occurs online?
21 6
Copyright infringement via peer-to-peer services is a new prob-
lem. It will likely take time for entities like the RIAA to develop effec-
tive control strategies. Although the DMCA was just the first step in
granting private entities the independent power to protect their copy-
rights online, it was a major one. It is true that the RLAA has had
difficulties with enforcing the DMCA while maintaining a positive
public image.217 These tribulations, however, result from the RIAA's
inexperience in the area. Over time, the RIAA will be able to correct
these deficiencies and strike a balance similar to that done by ordinary
retail outlets seeking to protect their products.
Regardless of the difficulties faced by the RIAA in enforcing the
DMCA, it is clear that increased governmental involvement is not the
answer. That is not to say that some involvement is not acceptable.
For example, the RJAA should be able to use the FBI seal as a tool to
frighten potential infringers. But small involvement like this can and
will occur without legislators consuming excessive public resources-
in fact, it already has.2 18 All that proposed bills like the Piracy Deter-
rence and Education Act of 2003 do is remove the burden of privately
enforcing the DMCA from copyright holders and place the burden on
the government, and ultimately the public. Such shifting of responsi-
bilities wastes taxpayer resources. 21 9
216 The two situations are admittedly different. For example, a store-level decision to
prosecute an individual shoplifer would not have the same nationwide implications as ac-
tive FBI involvement in prosecuting thousands of individual downloaders across the United
States. Nonetheless, the analogy illustrates the principle that similar conduct (catching a
shoplifer stealing a CD from a store or catching an individual illegally downloading a song
from the Internet) should not be treated differently.
217 See, e.g., Students Angry, supra note 161 (describing a seventy-nine year old man who
was sued by the RIAA for violating the DMCA despite the fact that the elderly man claims
he does not even own a computer or knows how to operate one); Youth Survey, supra note
180 (citing a study finding that two-thirds of American teens oppose the fines for file shar-
ing sought by the RIAA).
218 See Hearing, supra note 11.
219 The decision of the Ninth Circuit in A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001), supports RIAA's active role. In Napster, the court stated: "[W]e
place the burden on plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster of copyrighted works and files
containing such works available on the Napster system before Napster has the duty to dis-
able access to the offending content." Id.
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In terms of criminal sanctions, the DMCA imposes stiffer penal-
ties than one sees for ordinary shoplifting.22 0 For example, a first-time
offender caught illegally downloading a single copyrighted song could
be subject to a $500,000 fine or five years imprisonment.2 2 ' Repeat
offenders could receive a $1,000,000 fine or ten years imprison-
ment.222 Shoplifters caught stealing a CD from a retail store would
not face such serious sanctions, and would receive nothing more than
a slap on the wrist. In New York, for example, one who shoplifts a CD
would face petty larceny charges or criminal possession of stolen prop-
erty in the fifth degree.2 23 Both are class A misdemeanors224 and
carry a maximum fine of $1,000 or imprisonment of up to one year.2 2 5
This is a substantial difference compared to the possible criminal
sanctions for violating the DMCA, even though a CD contains many
songs, while a DMCA violation can result from downloading or shar-
ing only one copyrighted song.
The stiffer criminal sanctions under the DMCA help compensate
for "the ease with which copyright works can be copied [online] and
the scale on which it can be done."226 But the DMCA does not stop
with criminal sanctions. It also provides another key form of relief to
copyright holders: the right to file a civil action. Under the DMCA,
any person injured as a result of a DMCA violation may bring a civil
action against the infringer.227 When faced with such an action, the
court may issue a temporary or permanent injunction, 22 order the
"modification or the destruction of any device or product involved in
the violation ,"229 or award damages.23 0
The key component of these civil actions is the right to receive
damages. Any damages awarded under these provisions are indepen-
dent of possible criminal fines. The damages provisions have both a
compensatory and punitive element, though the statute does not use
such terms. The DMCA's damages provisions permit an injured party
to collect the actual damages sustained, plus any additional profits
220 Cf DAVID I. BAINBRIDGE, INTRODUCrION TO COMPUTER LAW 330 (4th ed. 2000)
("The scope and magnitude of criminal penalties have been gradually increased and
strengthened to cater for the growing ease of copying with the advent of high speed ...
computers.").
221 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(1) (1998).
222 See id. § 1204(a)(2).
223 See N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 155.25, 165.40 (McKinney 1999).
224 See id.
225 See id. §§ 70.15(1), 80.05(1).
226 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 220, at 330.
227 See 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a).
228 Id. § 1203(b) (1); seeA & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901
(N.D. Cal. 2000), reversed in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (granting injunctive relief
to injured plaintiffs).
229 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(6).
230 See id. § 1203(b) (3).
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made by the violator that are attributable to the infringing conduct. 231
This recovery of profits plays the role of the compensatory element of
the damages provisions.
Alternatively, the injured party may elect to receive statutory dam-
ages.232 If an injured party elects this option, he would instead receive
an award between $200 to $2,500 for each violation of Section 1201 of
the DMCA,233 and $2,500 to $25,000 for each violation of Section
1202 of the DMCA.2 3 4 This section represents de facto punitive dam-
ages, since the possible amount of the award far exceeds any actual
loss sustained by the injured party.2 35
Some skeptics may argue that the amount of statutory damages is
not excessive since the probability that a song would only be
downloaded once is minimal. Nevertheless, the amount of statutory
damages listed in the statute is for each violation. In other words, the
DMCA arguably gives an injured party the right to statutory damages
for each time a file is downloaded illegally.23 6 Thus, the increase in
actual losses sustained by the copyright holder would be proportional
to the increase in available statutory damages under the DMCA.
237
These high statutory, or punitive, damages make the DMCA a
highly-effective tool for private entities to protect their copyrights on-
line. The drafters of the DMCA made it very easy for copyright hold-
ers to obtain these statutory damages during the course of a civil
action, and can be elected any time prior to the final judgment being
entered. 23 8 These damage amounts are much higher and easier to
obtain than those available to ordinary retail outlets. 239 A store, or the
record company for that matter, is not statutorily entitled to receive
thousands of dollars from someone for shoplifting a CD (with multi-
231 See id. § 1203(c)(1)(A).
232 See id. § 1203(c)(1)(B).
233 See id. § 1203(c) (3) (A). Section 1201 of the DMCA refers to circumvention of cop-
yright protection systems. See id. § 1201 (a)-(b); supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
234 See id. § 1203(c) (3) (B). Section 1202 of the DMCA refers to the integrity of copy-
right management information. See id. § 1202(a)-(b).
235 For example, each time a party illegally shares an MP3 song file, the most that the.
copyright holder could claim in actual losses is the price of the CD that the song is on.
236 See 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(3)(A), (B).
237 For example, suppose the price of a CD is $10. If a song was shared only once, the
copyright holder (likely the record company) would only suffer, at most, $10 in actual
damages. However, the copyright holder would possibly be able to receive up to $25,000 in
statutory damages, netting him a gain of $24,990. Now, assume the song was shared twice.
The actual losses would be, at most, $20. However, the record company could potentially
receive up to $50,000 in statutory damages for the two violations of the DMCA. This would
give the record company a net gain of $49,980. It is important to note that this presup-
poses that the individual being charged is capable of paying such high damages without
becoming insolvent. Obviously, the higher the amount gets, it is less likely to be the case
that one could pay the damages without becoming insolvent.
238 See 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c) (3) (A), (B).
239 See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
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ple songs). The store would be fortunate to retrieve the stolen CD or
receive its cash value.
As one commentator has pointed out, "[T] ort remedies will have
the potential to fill the enforcement gap in cyberspace, especially
where law enforcement agencies have not addressed high-tech is-
sues. '240 Because tort remedies fill the enforcement gap, law enforce-
ment agencies do not need to become involved in the enforcement
process.2 4 Copyright holders should be able to notify the authorities
of a DMCA violation if they feel criminal sanctions are appropriate for
the violator, much like the practice of retail outlets today.242
Even if other circuits follow the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Ver-
izon,243 with the effect of possibly making identification of individual
online infringers more difficult, this does not mean that government
involvement is necessary.244 The high-damage awards mean that even
small numbers of enforcement actions will likely result in high levels
of deterrence. 245 Moreover, although it may be more difficult to de-
tect infringers and obtain judgments against them, the copyright
holder has a substantial monetary incentive to pursue the private en-
forcement option.
Furthermore, copyrighters should implement measures to make
their products more difficult to steal online. The primary responsibil-
ity for protecting a product must fall on its owner. If the techniques
used by retailers to prevent shoplifting were not perfected over time,
then intuitively there would be higher levels of theft.246 Although
240 Rustad, supra note 94, at 66.
Tort remedies are more flexible than criminal law and can be updated
more easily to adapt to cyberspace. Tort law carries no death penalty and
cannot incarcerate a defendant. Instead, it offers the remedy of punitive
damages-civil punishment in the form of monetary damages proportional
to the wealth of the defendant. Tort remedies adapted to Internet wrong-
doing will play an increasingly important role in punishing and deterring
fraud, hacking, and other wrongdoing on the Internet.
Id.
241 See id. at 115 (arguing that legal time lags makes criminal statutes quickly outdated
in the area of "cybercrime enforcement," creating an "impossible burden to meet at a time
when emerging technologies give rise to novel forms of socially harmful behavior").
242 Additionally, copyright holders may wish to notify the authorities if they plan on
collecting heavy tort damages from an individual, as such documentation will only
strengthen their case against the individual.
243 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d
1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that "a subpoena may be issued only to an ISP en-
gaged in storing on its servers material that is infringing or the subject of infringing
activity").
244 The legislature could simply overturn this decision by amending the DMCA so as to
require ISPs to disclose user information, even if the illegally transferred files are not
stored on their servers.
245 See Rustad, supra note 94, at 66.
246 See Patricia-Anne Tom, Security: Stopping the Shrink RETAIL TitA5vIc (Apr. 1, 2000)
(noting that store owners have a responsibility in the fight against shoplifting and explain-
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"digital technology facilitates the copying and distribution of digital
information, it also permits greater control over the use and distribu-
tion of information."2 4 7 Thus, as technology further develops, "'au-
thors and publishers can have more, not less, control over their
work."' 248 Since digital technology needs computer code to operate,
"computer code can be used to regulate behavior."2 49
The RJAA could use computer code to strengthen the anticir-
cumvention technology on CDs, thus making them harder to "rip"
into MP3 files.2 5 0 In this vein, the RAA has taken limited steps to
curb the spread of MP3s, including the proposal of the Secure Digital
Music Initiative (SDMI).251 If adopted, the SDMI would require con-
sumer electronics manufacturers to adopt trusted systems technol-
ogy252 before commercially recorded music could be played on their
components. 259 If effective, this program could prevent CDs from be-
ing ripped, copied, burned, or downloaded for free. 254 Efforts like
these are preferable to increased government intervention and sur-
veillance of individual online activity.
Patience truly is a virtue when dealing with this new problem.
Current attempts at private enforcement of the DMCA have proven
effective at deterring illegal MP3 file sharing without excessive govern-
ment intervention. 255 Just the threat of legal action prompted many
ing methods that best combat retail shoplifting), at http://retailtrafficmag.com/mag/
retail-security-shopping-shrink.
247 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Eco-
nomics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. Rey. 263, 274 (2002).
248 Id. (quoting Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property
Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 137, 138 (1997)).
249 Id. (citing LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)).
250 See id. at 275-76.
251 See id. at 275 (citing Matt Richtel & Sara Robinson, Ear Training: A Digital Music
Primer, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1999, at C6).
252 "Trusted systems use encryption to prevent unauthorized access to digital content,
and they use rights management to determine what 'rights' any given user has with respect
to that content." Id. at 274-75 (footnotes omitted). Thus, "through the use of trusted sys-
terns, current copyright holders can use technology to control how works are accessed." Id.
at 274.
253 Id. at 275.
254 Id. at 276. The RIAA can look at what has been done with DVDs:
The motion picture industry adopted a similar approach with digital movies
distributed on DVDs. Each DVD is encrypted by a copy protection system
known as the Content Scramble System ("CSS"). A movie recorded on
DVD may only be viewed on players and computer equipment using CSS-
licensed technology, and the equipment is programmed to permit the user
to play, but not copy, the movie.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
255 See Press Release, NPD, Consumers Delete Large Numbers of Digital Music Files
from PC Hard Drives, the NPD Group Reports: RIAA Lawsuits Appear to be a "Win" for the
Record Industry, but Winning Back the Hearts of Consumers is Another Matter (Nov. 5,
2003) [hereinafter Press Release], available at http://www.npd.com/press/releases/
press.031105.htm; Business Wire, NPD, RIAA Lawsuits Appear to Reduce Music File Shar-
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individuals to delete all MP3s from their computer. 256 For instance,
after the RIAA launched its aggressive campaign against individual
MP3 file sharers in May of 2003, 606,000 households deleted all MP3
files on their computers.2 57 This rate continued to increase, with 1.4
million households deleting all MP3 files in August of 2003.258 In ad-
dition, there has been a decrease in overall MP3 file sharing via peer-
to-peer networks. 259 In April of 2003, 852 million MP3 files were
traded.2 60 ByJune of 2003, this number fell to 655 million.2 6 1 From
August to September of 2003, the total number of households acquir-
ing MP3 files via peer-to-peer networks declined by eleven percent,
and the total number of MP3 files downloaded decreased by nine per-
cent.2 62 These figures indicate that the mere threat of private en-
forcement has proven effective at protecting the interests of the RIAA
and other copyright holders by deterring individuals from sharing
and downloading MP3 files.2 63 Once actual civil and criminal judg-
ments are obtained against some individuals, these numbers are likely
to continue their trend at an even more rapid pace.
There are also nontechnological measures the RIAA can imple-
ment to limit illegal file sharing. For example, the RIAA could work
at changing the public perception of both the record industry as a
whole and the severity of the effects of file sharing on the industry and
its artists. The RLAA has made an attempt at this. Its website now has
an area dedicated to informing the public about what constitutes
piracy, its negative effects, and recent news on the battle against it.264
Another organization, Music United for Strong Internet Copyright
("MUSIC"), has also launched a campaign against piracy.265 This or-
ing, According to The NPD Group (Aug. 21, 2003), at http://www.businesswire.com/web-
box/bw.082103/232335023.htm.
256 Sep Press Release, supra note 255.
257 See id.; Business Wire, supra note 255.
258 See Press Release, supra note 255.
259 See id.; Business Wire, supra note 255.
260 See Business Wire, supra note 255.
261 See id.
262 See Press Release, supra note 255.
263 An effective enforcement mechanism is one of the three fundamental characteris-
tics of enforceability. See CHRISTOPHER REED, INTERNET LAw: TEXT AND MATERIALS 266-67
(2000). The others are: (1) "that compliance with the law or regulation [is] . . . feasible,"
and (2) that the law is "limited in its application to those over whom the legislator has a
legitimate claim." Id. at 266. The other two criteria mentioned above are satisfied as well.
With respect to the first characteristic, compliance with the DMCA is certainly feasible: all
one has to do is cease downloading copyrighted music without permission. With respect to
the second characteristic, the DMCA only applies to individuals within the jurisdiction of
the United States.
264 See Recording Industry Association of America, Anti-Piracy, at http://
www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
265 See MusicUnited.org, Why You Shouldn't Do It, at http://www.musicunited.org/
4_shouldntdoit.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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ganization uses celebrities to spread its antipiracy message. 266 One
author suggests that "educational campaigns should rely less on fa-
mous artists and large organizations to spread the antipiracy message
and more on the impact file sharing has on lesser known artists, song-
writers and independent labels." 267 This approach may be problem-
atic, however, because some artists actually benefit from the
widespread sharing of their songs. Widespread swapping of an un-
known artist's song can occasionally open the door to superstardom
for these individuals. For example,, singer John Mayer attributes
much of his newfound success to file sharing: "Napster has come and
gone, and a lot of people think it didn't do all that much for any-
body.... But it bolstered the careers of a few people, and I was one of
them."268
The RIAA should also make a stronger attempt to alter the public
perception of file sharing. People understand that stealing a CD from
a store is wrong. Yet a recent poll revealed that two-thirds of Ameri-
can teens oppose fines for file sharing.269 The study found that nearly
eight out of ten American teens feel that sharing and downloading
copyrighted music files should be legal. 270 Another study found that
seventy-eight percent of the people who download music do not feel
that they are stealing-fifty-three percent of general Internet users
agreed with them.271 Sixty-one percent of those who download music
claimed that they could care less if the music is copyrighted.2 72 Yet
another study concluded that there is a public norm that copying for
others is acceptable, so long as it is not for profit. 273 The RIAA needs
to work at changing this perception so that illegal file sharing is
viewed as being as immoral as shoplifting. If the RIAA can convince
society that this behavior is unacceptable, enforcement of the DMCA
266 See MusicUnited.org, What the Artists and Songwriters Have to Say, at http://
www.musicunited.org/3_artists.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
267 Norman, supra note 22, at 405.
268 SeeJon Regardie, Going Ape!, BLENDER, June-July 2002, at 67, 68.
Mayer's newfound assurance carries over to his fans, whom he encourages
to tape his performances. it's not unusual for a gaggle of wire-strewn
squares to arrive long before showtime, set up microphone stands and,
within minutes of returning home, upload the concerts on the Internet,
where a thrivingJohn Mayer file-sharing community exists.
Id.
269 SeeYouth Survey, supra note 180.
270 See id.
271 Amanda Lenhart et al., Downloading Free Music: Internet Music Lovers Don't Think It's
Stealing, THE PEW INTERNET & AM. LIF PROJECT, 2 (Sept. 28, 2000), available at http://www.
pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP-Online_Music-Report2.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).
272 Id.
273 See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, COPYRIGHT AND HOME COPYNG:
TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES THE LAW 163-64 (1989), available at http://www.wws.
princeton.edu/-ota/diskl/1989/8910-n.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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would be a much easier task-in fact, it would likely lead to a decrease
in DMCA violations.
274
Additionally, the RIAA should also work at changing the "us ver-
sus them" mentality that many consumers have. One way that this can
be accomplished is by lowering the prices of CDs. This will help
change the public perception that the record companies are charging
exorbitant prices, which may not be an erroneous belief. In Septem-
ber of 2002, five U.S. record distributors settled a lawsuit brought by
forty-one states for $143 million dollars.275 The lawsuit claimed that
these distributors were involved in an illegal price-fixing scheme to
keep CD prices high.276 If the record industry worked at making CDs
more affordable, 27 7 individuals may feel worse about illegally
downloading MP3 files.
CONCLUSION
The illegal distribution of copyrighted music files is a recent but
pervasive problem. The recording industry will do everything in its
power to protect its assets, including asking the government to do it
for them. Congress, eager to aid in the process, passed the DMCA to
help private entities protect their copyrights online. This legislation
has enabled private entities to receive high punitive awards from on-
line infringers. Additionally, the DMCA carries with it the threat of
stiff criminal sanctions. The RJAA has utilized the DMCA to attack
both the providers of file sharing services, and, more recently, the in-
dividual users of these services. Despite the effectiveness of these at-
tacks, the RIAA has become impatient and maintains that it needs
strong government involvement in the process.
274 See Wu, supra note 92, at 723 (describing how "statistics suggest that P2P applica-
tions have . . . successfully sidestepped social norms that might otherwise bolster compli-
ance with the copyright regime").
275 See Norman, supra note 22, at 405-06.
276 See id. at 406.
277 This could be done not only by lowering the prices of CDs, but also by making the
songs available for download online at a discounted price. Since many people are willing
to download songs online, it follows that many are not concerned with glitzy, unnecessary
packaging that accompanies store-bought CDs. Thus, by cutting costs, the record industry
could drive down CD prices. Alternatively, the record industry could build value into the
"extras" that come with the CD. If people believe that they are actually getting something
of value when they purchase the CD, they may be more apt to actually do so. See id. at
408-09 (suggesting packaging methods the record industry could use to build value in the
store-bought product); see also Bill DeMain, John Mayer Inside Looking In, PEPF. SONGWRITER,
Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 45, 49-50 (
What we're up against right now, in terms of music industry, in terms of file
sharing, in terms of losses, is not a matter of "How do we tell kids to stop
stealing?" Because it's not stealing. It's a matter of "How do we turn peo-
ple on to the experience of owning a CD?"
(quoting musicianJohn Mayer)).
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The government has strongly supported the RIAA in its battle.
Copyrighters can use the FBI seal on digital recordings and the RIAA
can avail itself of the stiff DMCA-created civil and criminal penalties.
Further legislation mandating even further government involvement,
however, is unnecessary. Proposed legislation like the Piracy Deter-
rence and Education Act of 2003 unfairly shifts the burden of enforc-
ing the DMCA on the government, and ultimately, on the taxpayers.
In addition, this proposed legislation is too overbearing and vague-
especially in light of the substantial powers it grants.
Instead of lobbying for legislation that increases government in-
volvement in DMCA enforcement, the RIAA should focus on other
means to correct the problem. Digital technology has "the power to
set music free," but it can also "lock it up."2 7 8 Through enhancing
anticircumvention technology, the RIAA can prevent the creation of
unauthorized MP3 files. Additionally, the RIAA should work at alter-
ing the public's perception of both the recording industry and of un-
approved file sharing of copyrighted works. Through these efforts,
the RIAA can protect their assets without wasting government re-
sources, thus permitting such resources to be better allocated to serv-
ing society's needs.
278 Ku, supra note 247, at 276.
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